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Old Age Pensions, Demography and Economic Growth 
in the Long Run: The French Case Revisited 
Anne Reimat ∗ 
Abstract: »Altersrenten, Demographie und langfristiges Wirtschaftswachstum: 
der Fall Frankreich neu besucht«. This paper analyses the evolution of the 
French pension system from the mid-nineteenth century to the current period. 
Competing or complementary hypotheses that can explain the long-run rise in 
pension expenditure are discussed. The determinants that appear to offer the 
best explanation for the evolution of pension expenditure are economic 
growth, the process of industrialization and ageing. The time series related to 
these determinants are cointegrated over the long run. A multivariate model is 
estimated in order to assess the long-run elasticities between the pension ex-
penditure and its main determinants. 
Keywords: pension system, demography, economic growth, industrialization. 
1.  Introduction 
The objectives of the paper are to analyse the evolution of old age pension 
expenditure from the middle of the nineteenth century to the current period in 
France. The French pension system displays singular past and current charac-
teristics (the early importance of public pensions, supremacy of pay-as-you-go 
funding (PAYG), ‘crowding-out’ of pension funds, different pension schemes 
according to workers’ status but encompassing coverage) regarding the land-
scape of pension systems across industrialized countries (Clark 2001; Feller 
2005). The particular relationship between the French retirement system, the 
demography, the economic growth and the process of industrialization can shed 
light on its historical evolution.  
The literature in this area often explains the increase in old age pension ex-
penditure by the evolution of the demography (demographic transition (the ‘old 
age security hypothesis’) and population ageing), the process of industrializa-
tion (which explains in particular the rise in occupational pension schemes in 
the most important companies and administrations) and the consequent decline 
in family support (Cutler and Johnson 2004), the evolution of income and 
economic growth that improve both the demand for old age security and the 
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possibility to fund it, the growing role of the state in a more complex economy 
as early pointed out by Wagner (1892), the market failures regarding pension 
provision (Barr and Diamond 2006) or the extension of workers’ and citizens’ 
rights (the ‘social democracy hypothesis’, Williamson and Pampel 1993). All 
these explanations certainly work together to explain the development of pen-
sion systems, but the importance of each explanatory variable is generally not 
specified and the existing empirical analyses often cover a shorter time period. 
This paper attempts to assess the role of several explanatory variables in the 
long-run evolution of the French pension system. The analysis is founded on 
empirical data on the French retirement system since the middle of the nine-
teenth century (Reimat 2000, 2001), time series relating to the French econom-
ic growth (Toutain 1997; Villa 1994), the process of industrialization (Thélot 
and Marchand 1991, 1997) and the particular French demography (Chesnais 
1986).  
Part 2 presents an overview of the French pension system history since the 
mid-nineteenth century and analyses the evolution of pension expenditures as a 
share of the GDP. Part 3 establishes a selection of theoretical hypotheses that 
can explain the old age pension growth over time. In particular, the respective 
roles of demography, industrialization, economic growth and state intervention 
are assessed. In part 4, we test and model the long-run relationship between 
pension expenditure and its determinants, demography, economic growth and 
spreading of salaried workers among the entire active population. We find that 
these time series are cointegrated over the long run and we then consider a 
multivariate model of the long-run relationship between old age pension ex-
penditure and its determinants. Part 5 concludes. 
2.  The French Pension System in the Long Run: 
An Overview 
The French pension system is gradually implemented from the mid-nineteenth 
century to the 2000s. Considering pensions as a share of the GDP, and includ-
ing all kinds of pensions (assistance, occupational schemes, funded and un-
funded schemes), five main periods can be distinguished (Figure 1). 
From 1850 to 1880, the main public administrations and some large compa-
nies began to implement pension schemes for their salaried workers (minors, 
rail workers), imitating the pension schemes created by the state for its own 
employees (civil servants, soldiers). These occupational pension schemes pro-
vided pensions for old workers as a way to retain workers who still maintained 
many links with agriculture and who still expected to work only for a limited 
period as salaried workers, before becoming self-employed in the agricultural 
sector or the artisanal sector. 
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A national pension fund was created in 1850 (‘Caisse Nationale des Re-
traites’) under the supervision of the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, to 
channel the workers’ savings for retirement. The levels of both the interest rate 
and the savings were guaranteed by the state. In the second part of the nine-
teenth century, some of the most solid friendly or mutual societies had created 
a pension fund for their members, although their role in the provision of pen-
sions has remained rather limited, their activity being rather focused on health 
and other social risks that are easier to cover than retirement. Solidarity to-
wards elderly persons was also ensured by the ‘bureaux de bienfaisance’, assis-
tance offered by local authorities, in order to provide poor people with food and 
money, or by the ‘hospices’, old age home catering for poor people. However 
the expenditures devoted to old age remained weak at this stage, estimated at 
between 0.5 and 0.8% of the GDP during the period (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Pension Expenditure in the Long Run (% of GDP) 
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From 1880 to the First World War, a first acceleration of old age pensions as a 
share of the GDP was observed. They began to represent more than 1% of the 
GDP. Occupational pension schemes continued to extend their cover in several 
sectors, particularly in the energy and transport sectors. In parallel, saving for 
retirement was promoted through different measures implemented by the state, 
both for the ‘Caisse Nationale des Retraites’ and for the mutual societies. The 
first means-tested assistance law regarding old people was adopted in 1905, 
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called ‘Assistance obligatoire aux vieillards, infirmes et incurables’, aimed at 
providing an allocation for people aged over 65 with low revenue or ensuring 
them admission to an old people’s home or poorhouse. 
The first attempt to create a public pension scheme was the law entitled ‘Re-
traites Ouvrières et Paysannes’ adopted in 1910, expected to provide funded 
pensions to salaried workers aged over 65 years, and after 30 years of contribu-
tions. However, the principle of mandatory contributions for both employers 
and employees was rapidly abandoned, and few workers and employers con-
tinued to pay their contributions after 1912 (Feller 2005). 
The interwar period is a key period in the development of old age expendi-
ture. Many companies that had previously set up their own pension schemes, 
particularly in the transport, energy and water supply sectors, already had ma-
ture pension funds. When the companies’ schemes were well developed in a 
sector, they gave birth to the schemes known as French ‘regimes spéciaux’, 
which allowed their beneficiaries to remain out the private sector’s employee 
pension scheme. For other salaried workers, the social insurance law was 
adopted in 1930, but insurance was weak concerning old age pensions, with 
only 4% contribution rates of wages (half employer and half employee). In the 
interwar period, the principle of pre-funding pensions became increasingly 
weakened, and instead pensions began to be paid on a PAYG basis. Both the 
occupational pension schemes (‘regimes spéciaux’) and the social insurance 
abandoned the principle of pre-funding contributions to finance the pensions. 
The post-war inflation had reduced the capital accrued by many pension funds, 
and companies had no other choice than PAYG to meet their commitments 
towards their employees. The social insurance law had been expected to fi-
nance pensions both on a PAYG and on a pre-funded basis, but the pre-funding 
part (2% of wages) was abandoned in 1941 in order to provide pensions imme-
diately to elderly people with the current contributions of the workers. 
After the Second World War, the growth of pensions as a percentage of the 
GDP was very important. The pension expenditure as a share of GDP repre-
sented 4% in the 1950s, but 12% in the middle of the 1980s. This was really the 
pension ‘golden age’, even if it was not yet the retirees’ golden age, given the 
fact that the living standard of old people remained modest.  
The French ‘regime general’ was created through the Social Security Act of 
1945. It covered all the employees of the private sector. The employees of the 
‘regimes spéciaux’ kept their own schemes, which were more advantageous 
than the newly introduced ‘regime general’. The self-employed obtained the 
creation of their own pension schemes. So, finally, the entire active population 
was covered, but under different pension schemes. The second pillar was pro-
gressively developed in the biggest companies in order to complete the modest 
pensions offered by the ‘regime general’. In 1972, a law made the complemen-
tary pensions mandatory for all the workers in the private sector. Since then, 
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the scope has been narrowing for the development of occupational pension 
funds or personal pensions (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: French Pension System (Data from 2009) 
Funded pension schemes: PERP, Corem, Prefon, Madelin, RMC, PERCO 
Pensions in 2009: €6bn (€1bn for individual pensions (PERP and others), €5bn for pension 
funds). 
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From the mid-1980s to the present day, a stage of more moderated growth in 
pension expenditure has taken place. The old age pension expenditure reached 
13-14% of the GDP in the late 2010s. A period of reforms had begun, which 
will concern all the schemes (private sector, public sector, ‘regimes spéciaux’). 
The objectives of the reforms are to raise the legal retirement age and to in-
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crease the qualifying years of social contributions (parametric reforms), but the 
overall logic of the pension system will remain unchanged.  
Figure 2 shows the current architecture of the French pension system, which 
is characterized by the importance of PAYG and public schemes and by the 
existence of different pension schemes according to workers’ status. 
3.  How can the Growth of Pension Expenditure  
in the Long Run be Explained? 
The hypotheses that can explain the growth in pension expenditure over time 
are multiple, competing or complementary. Some authors have put forward 
political and cultural reasons. The ‘social democracy hypothesis’ (Lindert 
1994; Williamson and Pampel 1993) explains the rise in social spending by the 
extension of voting rights, the extending power of social democratic parties and 
unionization1. Cutler and Jonhson (2004) and Lindert (1994) found differences 
in social spending and the adoption of social laws between Catholic and 
Protestant countries. Nevertheless, we focus here on hypotheses based on eco-
nomic (industrialization, role of the state, economic growth and market fail-
ures) and demographic (demographic transition and ageing) explanations (Barr 
1996; Barr and Diamond 2006). Indeed, their role in the growth of pension 
expenditure in the long term from the middle of the nineteenth century to the 
current period, appears more direct and measurable and, above all, valid 
throughout the entire period. 
3.1  The Industrialization Hypothesis 
The industrial revolution involved major socioeconomic changes, urbanization, 
an increase in the number of factory workers and salaried workers and a drop in 
the solidarities within the family. Even though intergenerational cohabitation 
had never been the norm in France in the nineteenth century, in the agricultural 
sector it was frequent for a child to be chosen to take care of his old parents 
(cohabitation or payment of a pension) in exchange for inheriting the familial 
farm. The French urban population represented 9.1 million persons in the mid-
nineteenth century (1851 census), 15 million at the end of the nineteenth centu-
                                                             
1  The shortcoming of the ‘social democracy hypothesis’ as regards our objective to analyse the 
long-run evolution of a pension system from the mid-nineteenth century until the current 
period is that these explanations should have worked out their full effect in industrial coun-
tries before 1960, or even before 1930 (Lindert 1994). 
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ry (1896) and 22.7 million at the end of the 1940s2. Workers in industry and 
building represented only 4.4 million in 1851, 6 million in 1896 and 6.4 million 
in the late 1940s (Thélot and Marchand 1991, 1997).  
Beyond the mere workers in industry and building, the progression of sala-
ried workers instead of self-employed workers appears important. Occupational 
pension schemes as well as the first public pension schemes (Retraites 
Ouvrières et Paysannes (Workers and Peasants Law) in 1910, Assurances So-
ciales (Social Insurance) in 1930, Sécurité sociale (Social Security) in 1945) 
were first implemented for salaried workers only. On the other hand, savings 
devoted to retirement (Caisse Nationale des Retraites) were used more by self-
employed workers, farmers or tradespeople.  
These changes tied to the process of industrialization can explain the need 
for the development of social insurance and welfare programmes. Furthermore, 
the birth of big companies is the favourite explanation for the appearance of 
companies’ occupational pension schemes during the course of the nineteenth 
century. By setting up pension arrangements, the companies tried firstly to 
retain their workforce and secondly to rationalize their management and to find 
a solution to dismiss the workers who were too old (Hannah 1985, 1986; Kastl 
and Moore 2010; Sass 1997).  
The industrialization thesis gives an explanation for the growth in pension 
expenditure throughout the nineteenth century and also explains the paradox of 
the pensions growth in the second part of the interwar period (see Figure 1). 
Indeed, the trend towards an increase in the number of big companies boosted 
the creation of occupational pension funds, while the economy suffered from 
the Great Depression and the low growth rates that followed (Hannah 1986). 
However, the industrialization thesis also suffers from weaknesses in ex-
plaining the rise in pension expenditure. Old age expenditures pursued its 
growth even after the decline of the industry after the 1970s, measured by the 
industrial employment as well as by its share of added value. Additionally, 
some newly industrialized countries seem reluctant to introduce welfare pro-
grammes, so relationships between industrialization and social spending are not 
automatic and easy to capture3.  
                                                             
2  The urban population is defined as the population of the localities that include at least 2000 
inhabitants. This definition was revised in 1962: the population in localities with no more 
than 2000 inhabitants but located in urban areas is now considered urban. 
3  We can add that the institutional arrangements of old age welfare differ markedly among 
industrialized countries, even at the beginning of the industrialization process. Schematical-
ly, in Anglo-Saxon countries, the pension system is more often organized on the basis of 
private and pre-funded pensions, while it is founded more on PAYG public pensions in con-
tinental European countries. 
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3.2  The Demography Hypotheses 
The demography hypotheses explain changes in social expenditure over time 
by the changes in demography, in particular the growing elderly population. 
3.2.1  Demographic Transition 
According to the ‘old age security hypothesis’, parents bear children because 
they expect their children to care for them in their later years. Such a hypothe-
sis often links the demographic transition to the support of elderly people. It 
suggests that in the Malthusian stage, children are considered as an asset that 
allows parents to transfer income to their old age. Higher incomes in this stage 
increase the fertility rate. In the post-Malthusian stage, technological progress 
rises and the population growth does not absorb the GDP growth. Higher in-
comes make it possible to save for retirement and/or begin to invest more in 
children’s education. Investment in education intervenes as the dominating 
force in the decline of fertility and demographic transition. At this stage, higher 
incomes are not translated into an increasing fertility rate. The acceleration in 
the rate of technological process during the second phase of the Industrial Rev-
olution increased the demand for human capital of people’s offspring (Galor 
2012). Finally, in the modern growth stage, the demographic transition reverses 
the positive relationship between income and population growth. Fertility rates 
decrease. 
This scenario describes the change from an informal and fertility-related 
pension system (in which children are responsible for the well-being of their 
old parents, and therefore future pension benefits are dependent on adult fertili-
ty decisions) to a formal pension system (in which the state organizes a manda-
tory public pension system). Holler (2008) demonstrated that theoretically, the 
introduction of a mandatory pay-as-you-go public pension system to a country 
with a previous informal, fertility-related pension system shifts down the in-
verted U-shaped demand for children connected to income increases. There-
fore, lower levels of income support an earlier escape from the first stage of 
demographic transition (in which income increases lead to increasing fertility). 
The ‘old age security hypothesis’ linked to the demographic transition suggests 
that pension systems can be a major driver for the decrease in fertility rates 
(Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones 2005).  
However, French historical demography provides little support for the ‘old 
age security’ thesis. Firstly, the French demographic transition is atypical 
(Chesnais 1986, 1996; Vallin and Caselli 1999). In the first stage, the mortality 
decline only shortly preceded the decrease in fertility. In the second stage, the 
fertility decrease had occurred long before the implementation of old age pen-
sions, so the direction of causality appears inverse to that expected according to 
the hypothesis: the fertility decrease could not be the result of the implementa-
tion of old age pensions. On the other hand, the French low fertility since the 
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nineteenth century could have played a role in the concern for pension system 
implementation, but if this is the case, it might only be in a marginal way. The 
birth rate in France was 26.8 per thousand in 1850, but 37.2 in Germany and 
33.4 in England (Chesnais 1986, 503). In 1900, the French birth rate was 21.3, 
but the rate was 35.6 in Germany and 28.7 in England. Beyond the traditional 
determinants of demographic transition, demographers explain the French low 
fertility rates as the result of the small size of farms (Chesnais 1986, 324). 
However, despite its low level of fertility, France does not appear to be a pio-
neering country in the implementation of a secure pension system. 
Secondly, the French baby boom after the Second World War coincided 
with the ‘pension system golden age’, in which the spreading of pension bene-
fits among old people was rapid and important and the entire working age 
population was automatically enrolled in pension schemes including both first 
and complementary pillars. These demographic facts then appear to contradict 
the prediction of the old age security hypothesis linking fertility and the pen-
sion system. 
3.2.2  The Role of Ageing 
The growth in the number of elderly people over the last centuries is remarka-
ble. The probability of reaching one’s sixtieth birthday increased during the 
nineteenth century, and over the last decades of the twentieth century, gains in 
life expectancy are also realized at the ages of 60, 70 and 80. Figure 3 displays 
the relationship between the proportion of elderly people and the share of pen-
sions as a percentage of the GDP. The bisector in Figure 3 indicates the situa-
tion in which the share of people aged 60 and over in the population equals the 
share of old age expenditure in the GDP. 
The share of people aged 60 and above represented less than 10% of the 
whole population in the middle of the nineteenth century, and currently repre-
sents more than 22%. In the middle of the nineteenth century, these 10% of 
elderly people received 0.5% of the GDP in pensions (Figure 3), and nowa-
days, the 22% of 60 years and over receive more than 13% of the GDP in pen-
sions. The comparison between the proportion of people aged 60 years and 
more and the pensions as a share of the GDP must be interpreted cautiously, 
though. Indeed, all the kinds of revenues that a person can gain are not taken 
into account (revenue from capital, from work, from other social transfers) and 
there is no equivalence between the population over 60 and the pensioners 
(some retire before 60 and some retire after 60). 
As the share of elderly people in the whole population increases, a rein-
forcement of pressure towards increased public spending on pensions must be 
expected. Political science has stressed the role of interest and age groups to 
explain the evolution of welfare expenditure (Goerres and Vanhuysse 2012). 
However, this mere explanation cannot rationalize the whole evolution of the 
HSR 37 (2012) 4  │  336 
pension system or the different institutional configurations of pension systems 
across nations. 
Figure 3: Elderly People and Pension Expenditure 
 
The link between the growth in pension expenditure and the proportion of 
elderly people appears solid but far from perfect, as we can see from the French 
data. Some periods are closer to the bisector than others: the 1970-1980 period, 
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Nationale des Retraites and other mechanisms of retirement savings are princi-
pally used by high-income households. 
The German economist Wagner (1892) has pointed at the end of the nine-
teenth century a ‘law’ of expanding state activity linked to higher levels of 
economic development. The increase in government spending in time is con-
sidered to be a result of high income elasticity in the demand for public goods. 
However, Wagner’s law fails to explain why in some wealthy and industrial-
ized countries, public welfare programmes appear later than in the poorest ones 
(Cutler and Johnson 2004), and why in periods of moderate economic growth 
or even recession, pension expenditure as well as social spending still rise, 
playing the role of ‘automatic stabilizers’. Furthermore, as pension schemes are 
mainly public in France (Figure 2), it seems irrelevant to explain the rise in 
pension expenditures by the rise in public spending, the causality appearing to 
be rather the reverse. 
According to the hypothesis of ‘market failures’, social insurance and public 
pensions are the result of the market incapacity to organize spontaneously 
adequate markets for private pensions and old age insurance. However, this 
hypothesis should explain only residual old age welfare programmes, and not 
the importance given to pension systems in most industrialized countries. The 
theory of ‘social insurance’, which explains why the insurance must be manda-
tory in order to bear the risks and face the lack of information between insurers 
and insured people better (adverse selection and moral hazard), provides a 
relevant support to the rise in old age social insurance. Nevertheless, this theory 
cannot explain the different institutional configurations of pension systems 
observed across industrialized countries: old age social insurance is more de-
veloped in European countries with a Bismarckian welfare regime (France, 
Germany) than in Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland, the UK). 
To sum up, the determinants that are expected to provide a better explana-
tion for the rise in pension expenditures over the long run seem to be ageing, 
the overall process of industrialization, and the economic growth. These expla-
nations are expected to play a role during the whole long-run period studied 
and to explain the evolution of the pension system as a whole, not only a com-
ponent of it. 
4.  Testing and Modelling the Long-Run Relationship 
 between Pension Expenditure and its Determinants 
In this part, we analyse the relationship between the French pension system 
expenditure, the economic growth, the industrialization process and ageing. We 
consider a system of variables that comprises the constant pension expenditure, 
denoted pt, the constant GDP, denoted yt, the consumer price index, denoted it, 
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the number of people aged 60 years and more, denoted dt, and the number of 
salaried workers, denoted st.  
We call Xt the vector of the studied variables. 
Xt = (Pt, Yt, It, Dt, St)’ 
where:  
Pt = ln (pt) 
Yt = ln (yt) 
It = ln (it) 
Dt = ln (dt) 
St = st/entire active population 
The studied variables, all but those relative to the expanding number of salaried 
workers (St), are expressed in logarithms, to allow for linearization of the geo-
metrical progression inherent in data expressed in levels. 
The data cover the 1851-2009 period, thus 159 years. The sources of the da-
ta are, for pension expenditure at date t, the time series reconstituted by Reimat 
(2000, 2001), for the GDP at constant prices, the series published by Toutain 
(1997) for the period 1850-1938 then Villa (1994) for the period 1938-1948 
and INSEE4 after 1949. We also include the consumer price index (sources: 
Toutain (1997), Villa (1994) and INSEE) in our vector.5 The population aged 
60 years and over is assessed on the basis of the census data (INSEE (1966) 
before 1950), and the number of salaried workers and the entire active popula-
tion are found in Thélot and Marchand (1991, 1997) and INSEE after 1990. 
The number of salaried workers is used as a proxy for an assessment of the role 
of industrialization, as it can explain the early development of occupational 
pension schemes in large companies (in the second part of the nineteenth centu-
ry and the first decades of the twentieth century) and later the development of 
public pension schemes devoted to salaried workers (both first pillar and com-
plementary pillar).  
                                                             
4  Recent data from INSEE are available on the French INSEE website. 
5  Johansen’s method for cointegration relies on the estimation of the VAR process, which 
summarizes all the statistical relationships between the considered variables. The VAR is a 
‘small’ macroeconomic model, and the consumer price index, real economic growth and 
pension expenditure are expected to have relationships (see Appendix, Table 2, Granger cau-
sality tests). We adopt here the point of view of Sargent and Sim (1977) and Lucas and Sar-
gent (1978), who suggest the estimation of macroeconomic models without a priori ideas 
about theories (the use of VAR), but with a relevant selection of variables. Another reason is 
that pensions are never perfectly indexed, or are indexed on past inflation, so part of the 
evolution of real pension expenditure should remain linked to inflation. Furthermore, some 
authors suggest relationships between real public spending and inflation (Klein 1985), or 
between real health expenditure and inflation (Van Elk, Mot and Franses 2010). 
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4.1  Cointegration of Long-Run Old Age Expenditures,  
Economic Growth, Ageing and Industrialization Time Series 
We analyse firstly the long-run properties of these different time series and 
their relationships, and therefore their degree of integration and the potential 
cointegration between the variables. 
For each time series, a unit root test (Dickey and Fuller 1979) is applied. For 
the whole period, the test shows that it was possible to consider each of these 
variables as integrated processes. In order to assess the number of relationships 
in this system with five variables, we refer to the procedures drawn up by Jo-
hansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990), who proposed the trace test 
and the maximal eigenvalue test (λmax). 
The Johansen approach to the analysis of cointegration is based upon the 
vector error correction model (VAR), as shown below: 
Δܺ௧ = ෍Γ௜	Δܺ௧ି௜ 	+ 	Π	ܼ௧ି௞	
௞ିଵ
௜ୀଵ
+ 	ܥ	 +	 ௧ܸ 
where Xt is a vector of variables (Pt, Yt, It, Dt, St) that are integrated processes 
and Γi and Π are coefficient matrices. 
The search for cointegration between the variables is undertaken via the ei-
genvalues of the long-run coefficient matrix Π using maximal eigenvalue and 
trace tests (Table 1 and Table 2). 
Table 1: Trace Test Statistics 
 Critical values 
H0: Rank ≤ x Test statistic 90 95 99 
0 94.06 65.82 69.82 77.82 
1 39.41 44.49 47.85 54.68 
2 18.56 27.07 29.80 35.46 
3  6.94 13.43 15.49 19.93 
4   0.998  2.71  3.84  6.63 
 
The test is issued from an unconstrained VAR model with a vector of constants 
C. 
The statistics value of the trace test associated with the rank ≤4, ≤3, ≤2, ≤1 
hypotheses are respectively against the H0 hypothesis, equal to 0.998, 6.94, 
18.56, 39.41. Then, more than one cointegration relationship should not exit. 
Concerning the rank=0 test, the trace statistic attains a value of 94.1, which is 
superior to the quintile at 90, at 95 and at 99 of its asymptotical distribution 
under the H0 hypothesis. 
The maximal eigenvalue (λmax) test confirms these results (see Table 2). We 
can then conclude to the existence of a unique cointegration relationship among 
the five studied variables. 
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This cointegration relationship applies in the long run, for more than a cen-
tury and a half, between pension expenditure, economic growth, ageing, the 
evolution of salaried workers among the active population and the consumer 
price index. This makes consistent both the choice of the variables and the 
multivariate modelling analysis that follows.6 
Table 2: Maximum Eigenvalue Test Statistics 
 Critical values 
H0: rank ≤ x Test statistic 90 95 99 
0 54.65 31.24 33.88 39.37 
1 20.86 25.12 27.59 32.72 
2 11.62 18.89 21.13 25.87 
3  5.94 12.30 14.26 18.52 
4 1  2.71   3.84  6.63 
4.2  Modelling the Long-Run Relationship 
In parallel, the above results support the formulation of a long-term relationship 
between the five variables via a multivariate equation (Engle and Granger 
1987, 1991). This will allow us, in particular, to appreciate the pension expend-
itures long-run responses as regards the studied variables through the estima-
tion of elasticity coefficients. However, this cannot be achieved using the coin-
tegrated coefficients resulting from Johansen’s methodology. Indeed, 
cointegrated systems must be interpreted cautiously (Lütkepohl 1993, 379). 
Cointegrated coefficients ignore all the other relations between the variables 
that are summarized in a VAR model. 
We then estimate the long-term elasticities between pension expenditure 
(Pt) and economic growth, ageing and the spreading of salaried workers 
through a multivariate equation.7 
  
                                                             
6  Tests for Granger-causality in the cointegrated system showed that the probabilities of non-
causality between ageing and pension expenditure, growth and pension expenditure, and 
the spreading of salaried workers and pension expenditure are low (see Appendix, Table 2). 
7  The least square (LS) estimation method ignores the cointegration restriction and estimates 
the process in levels of the original variables without taking differences. Indeed, Park and 
Phillips (1989) and Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) have shown that the unconstrained LS 
estimator has the same asymptotic properties as the maximum likelihood estimator that 
observes the cointegration restriction. An additional result is that the usual estimator of the 
covariance matrix is a consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix (Lütkepohl 
1993, 369). This property allows us to consider the student test as relevant. 
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We estimate the equation as follows:  
௧ܲ
ሺݐ	ݏݐݑ݀݁݊ݐሻ
= 1,1
ሺ13.0ሻ
௧ܻ +	 0,8
ሺ3.4ሻ
	ܦ௧ +	 0,2	
ሺ10.1ሻ
ܫ௧ +	0,02	
ሺ3.6ሻ
௧ܵିଵଶ −	 0,6	
ሺ13.9ሻ
ܫ݊݀݅ܿଵଽଵହିଵଽଷ଴ 		
+ 	 0,4	
ሺ9.4ሻ
ܫ݊݀݅ܿଵଽଶ଻ିଵଽସ଺ − 12,0
ሺ3.3ሻ
+	∈௧ 
R2 = 99.5% 
where Indic1915-1930 equals 1 on the 1915-1930 period and 0 otherwise,  
and Indic1927-1946 equals 1 on the 1927-1946 period and 0 otherwise. 
 
These indicator variables allow for the historical particularity of the interwar 
period to be taken into account (see Figure 1).  
The spreading of the salaried workers among the active population is inte-
grated with 12 years of delay, computed in order to maximize the student t. At 
the same time, it is relevant to introduce a lag between the spreading of salaried 
workers among the active population, and the implementation of pension 
schemes for aged workers. 
Figure 4: Long-Run Pension Expenditure Modelling 
 
 
The results of the estimation are plotted in Figure 4. As the equation is built on 
the logarithms of the variables, it allows for an interpretation of the coefficients 
as elasticity coefficients. 
Thus, during a century and a half, growth of 1% of constant GDP involves 
growth of 1.1% of the pension expenditure, growth of 1% of people aged 60 
years and more entails growth of 0.8% of the pension expenditure, and a 100 
HSR 37 (2012) 4  │  342 
point increase in the proportion of salaried workers among the active popula-
tion raises the pension expenditure by 0.02% and prices also have a positive 
effect on pension expenditure. 
In short, it appears quite consistent that pension expenditures presents an 
elasticity of order one to the GDP and to ageing. The pension expenditure has 
been affected in the long run by economic growth, demography and the in-
crease in the number of salaried workers. 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
The present study has analysed the evolution of the French pension system in 
the long run – over more than 150 years. Pension expenditure represented less 
than 0.5% of the French GDP in the mid-nineteenth century, and currently 
represents 13.5% of the GDP (2010). Pension expenditure includes all the 
pension schemes (occupational pension schemes, funded pensions, public pen-
sion schemes and old age assistance). Several hypotheses were put forward and 
discussed to explain this long-run evolution, and permitted us to select a num-
ber of variables – industrialization, economic growth and ageing – that we 
might expect to be strongly related to pension expenditure.  
We found that the GDP, consumer price index, spreading of salaried work-
ers among the active population, ageing and pension expenditure are signifi-
cantly cointegrated in the long term. Economic growth, the process of industri-
alization and ageing explain a great part of the increase in pension expenditure. 
The estimation of a multivariate model allowed us to assess the effects (elas-
ticity) of these determinants on the pension expenditure’s evolution. 
The analysis implemented here for the French pension system should be en-
riched later by further interesting developments. In particular, three improve-
ments can be suggested. Firstly, even if long-run cointegration is established, a 
statistical analysis that distinguishes several periods of time should allow the 
measurement of the importance of each determinant during different periods. 
Indeed, the test for cointegration assumes that the relationship is constant dur-
ing the studied period. Yet, the long-run relationship between the underlying 
variables can change, especially during the long time period considered. 
Secondly, despite the overall reliable fit founded between the variables, per-
haps the introduction of other determinants discussed in part 3 but not included 
in the test for cointegration and the modelling, and perhaps different ones for 
each period, should also improve the knowledge relating to pension expendi-
ture’s trends.  
Thirdly, it will be interesting to conduct a long-term comparative analysis of 
pension systems, and verify whether the same determinants can explain the 
long-run evolution of pension expenditures in other countries. However, this 
implies the availability of long-run time series for at least a century, which 
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severely reduces the number of countries that can be selected for such a com-
parison. Following the same idea of improving the knowledge of pension sys-
tems through comparative analysis, it should be useful to consider not only the 
pension expenditure as a whole, but several components of the pension ex-
penditure (old age assistance, first pillar, second pillar…) and their determi-
nants. 
This long-term comparison should be particularly interesting, as the French 
pension system model is considered quite singular in comparative analyses. 
The importance of pay-as-you-go pensions, mandatory social contributions, the 
second pillar that encompasses all private sector workers, the quasi-absence of 
funded pensions, and pensions as a share of GDP, which distinguishes the 
French model, are indeed the legacy of a long history. 
Appendix  
Table 3: Pension expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 1850-2009 (source: 
Reimat 2000, 2001) 
Year 
Pension 
expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
Year 
Pension 
expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
Year 
Pension 
expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
Year 
Pension 
expendi-
tures (% of 
GDP) 
1850 0.72% 1890 1.00% 1930 1.97% 1970  7.41% 
1851 0.72% 1891 0.99% 1931 2.39% 1971  7.33% 
1852 0.64% 1892 0.99% 1932 2.88% 1972 7.54% 
1853 0.65% 1893 1.06% 1933 3.03% 1973  7.63% 
1854 0.58% 1894 1.02% 1934 3.35% 1974  8.06% 
1855 0.58% 1895 1.10% 1935 3.74% 1975  8.95% 
1856 0.54% 1896 1.11% 1936 3.92% 1976  9.24% 
1857 0.55% 1897 1.22% 1937 3.32% 1977  9.60% 
1858 0.60% 1898 1.15% 1938 3.17% 1978  9.86% 
1859 0.63% 1899 1.12% 1939 2.92% 1979  9.99% 
1860 0.56% 1900 1.13% 1940 3.77% 1980 10.61% 
1861 0.55% 1901 1.23% 1941 4.74% 1981 10.90% 
1862 0.54% 1902 1.24% 1942 4.32% 1982 11.28% 
1863 0.55% 1903 1.21% 1943 4.16% 1983 11.83% 
1864 0.55% 1904 1.19% 1944 4.46% 1984 11.99% 
1865 0.59% 1905 1.18% 1945 4.55% 1985 12.28% 
1866 0.55% 1906 1.20% 1946 3.71% 1986 12.01% 
1867 0.58% 1907 1.14% 1947 3.91% 1987 11.86% 
1868 0.54% 1908 1.32% 1948 2.70% 1988 11.79% 
1869 0.56% 1909 1.32% 1949 3.14% 1989 11.61% 
1870 0.61% 1910 1.36% 1950 3.31% 1990 11.68% 
1871 0.65% 1911 1.29% 1951 3.41% 1991 11.90% 
1872 0.63% 1912 1.24% 1952 3.50% 1992 12.09% 
1873 0.71% 1913 1.37% 1953 3.73% 1993 12.48% 
1874 0.70% 1914 1.66% 1954 3.86% 1994 12.50% 
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Table 4: Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
Yt does not Granger Cause Pt 
Pt does not Granger Cause Yt 158 
0.69619 
3.68489 
0.4053 
0.0567 
Dt does not Granger Cause Pt 
Pt does not Granger Cause Dt 158 
3.55958 
0.12412 
0.0611 
0.7251 
It does not Granger Cause Pt 
Pt does not Granger Cause It 158 
13.5870 
3.21022 
0.0003 
0.0751 
St does not Granger Cause Pt 
Pt does not Granger Cause St 158 
0.66859 
4.15717 
0.4148 
0.0432 
Dt does not Granger Cause Yt 
Yt does not Granger Cause Dt 158 
5.91391 
0.25010 
0.0162 
0.6177 
It does not Granger Cause Yt 
Dt does not Granger Cause Pt 158 
16.9416 
25.7592 
6.E-05 
1.E-06 
St does not Granger Cause Yt 
Yt does not Granger Cause St 158 
2.53426 
4.19422 
0.1134 
0.0422 
It does not Granger Cause Dt 
Dt does not Granger Cause It 158 
4.09579 
0.20698 
0.0447 
0.6498 
St does not Granger Cause Dt 
Dt does not Granger Cause St 158 
8.14406 
7.41109 
0.0049 
0.0072 
St does not Granger Cause It 
It does not Granger Cause St 158 
0.11798 
3.17021 
0.7317 
0.0770 
Sample: 1851 2009 
Lags: 1 
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